In this paper we present a dynamic model of a firm which decides whether to outsource parts of its production to a less developed economy where wages and the level of technology are lower. Outsourcing reduces production costs but is associated with spillovers to foreign potential competitors. Spillovers over time increase productivity of firms in the foreign country and make them stronger competitors on the common market. The paper analyzes the inter-temporally optimal behavior of the firm and shows that two outcomes are possible in the long-run. There is one steady state where the firm invests a positive amount in the foreign country and there is a continuum of steady states with no investment. The paper then derives conditions such that it is optimal for the firm to invest in the foreign country and different types of optimal dynamic investment patterns are characterized. In addition, using numerical dynamic optimization methods, the effect of the speed of technology adoption and of the wage differential on total labor income in the home country, is studied taking into account the transition dynamics.
Introduction
With the decline of communism in the nineties of the last century, Central and Eastern European economies have become more open and more attractive for foreign capital. At the same time, the high growth rates of Asian countries such as China or India have also attracted foreign investors more frequently. Although most of foreign direct investment (FDI) is still undertaken in industrialized countries such as the US, Great Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands, just to mention a few, more and more direct investment flows to the newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Central and Eastern Europe and to Asian economies. According to the UNCTAD 2007 World Investment Report [26] the highest increase in FDI inflows from 2005 to 2006 among all regions occured in South-East Europe with a growth of 74%. One important motivation for firms to invest in NICs is to get access to these markets, however, recent empirical evidence suggests that cost considerations have gained importance relative to market entry motives for foreign investment and are now in many cases the main factor influencing firms location decisions (see Kinkel and Lay [16] ) 1 .
From a political perspective FDI is highly appreciated in the countries where the investment is undertaken. An important aspect in this respect is the expectation that FDI does not only generate income for local firms and workers, but also raises the productivity of local producers in the industry where investment takes place and also in vertically related indistries. Hence many NICs hope that spill-overs will reduce the gap to the technoligcial frontier and that may help to make the whole economy benefit from new the investments. Several channels of spillovers have been discussed in the literature, most prominently the demonstration effect, labor turnover (both inducing horizontal spillovers) and vertical linkages (see e.g. Saggi [23] ). Although the empirical evidence concerning the existence of positive horizontal spillovers from FDI is mixed (see e.g. Görg and Greenaway [8] ), recent empirical studies find positive horizontal spillovers from FDI using firm level data from Hungary (Halpern and Murakozy [12] ), Romania (Smarzynska and Spatareanu [25] ) and from 17 emerging market economies (Gorodnichenko et al. [9] ).
So, while the firm that undertakes FDI may gain in the short-run from lower costs in NICs, spill-over effects can raise productivity of (potential) competitors in foreign countries. In particular in industries where markets have become globalized such improvements of the competitiveness of foreign producers might severely affect future revenues of the firm. Therefore, a firm thinking about FDI faces a trade-off between short-run cost advantages and loosing its competitive edge on the (global) market in the long-run.
A dynamic view is needed to analyze the trade-off described above, and in this contribution we present a theoretical model of a firm that faces the corresponding inter-temporal optimization problem. In contrast to other contributions within that line of research (see our literature review below), we assume that firms in the home country and in the foreign country compete on the same market. Most existing theoretical work relies on the market opening motive for FDI and assumes a local market in the foreign country. In our framework the firm under consideration operates on an oligopolistic market and may move some of its production by investing in physical capital in a NIC. Such investment, however, goes along with positive spill-overs which raise the productivity of competitors of the firm in the NIC. The incentive to invest in the foreign country are cost reductions due to lower wages there.
While most contribution in the literature do not explicitly study the dynamics of the model, our goal with this paper is to pay special attention both to the long-run outcome of our model as well as to its transition dynamics. In particular, we are interested in the question how the transient and the long-run outcome is affected by economic factors like the initial productivity and wage gap between the regions or the spillover rate. A main finding of our study in this respect is that there are two classes of co-existing steady-states, one with and one without FDI, and that small changes in the economic factors mentioned above might induce that the long-run outcome jumps from one type to the other. The insight that there might be a non-continuous shift between an FDI and a non-FDI regime is a new finding in this area of research that is based on our dynamic approach. This insight has important implications for economic policy design.
The best way to reach certain policy goals might be to influence the system such that the initial state moves into the basin of attraction of a steady state that is desired by the policy-maker.
Although we do not explicitly consider the role of a policy maker in our model, we give some indication of such type of analysis by examining the impact of key parameters on current and accumulated labor income and on accumulated firm profits. In terms of transient investmend dynamics our dynamic approach allows us to address an issue raised by empirical observations about the dynamic patterns of foreign investment. Using data from German manufacturing firms Kinkel and Maloca [17] report that about 17% of the firms who have moved (parts of) their production abroad in 2000/2001 re-transfered it back to Germany within the follwing five years. Obviously such a pattern of investment followed by disinvestment might be due to incorrect expectations about production conditions in the foreign country or actual changes in these conditions, but, as we show in this study, under certain conditions it might also correspond to intertemporally optimal behavior in the presence of technological spillovers. In particular, we demonstrate that such non-monotone investment patterns are optimal if the initial technology gap between the two countries is sufficiently large.
In order to characterize the optimal investment paths and their dependency from parameters and initial conditions we combine an analytical and a numerical approach. Steady-state outcomes can be fully described by analytical means and we can also analytically provide some characterization of the basins of attraction of the co-existing steady states. To gain additional insights about the transient dynamics and the sensitivity with respect to key parameters of the firm's and workers income streams under optimal investment a numerical dynamic programming algorithm with grid adaptation in the state-space is used.
Considering the theoretical literature dealing with FDI one realizes that most contributions are static multi-stage models or focus on the steady sate of dynamic models (a survey of theoretical models is presented by Cheng [4] and Saggi [23] ). Several papers study the entry mode decision between FDI and exporting in multi-stage oligopoly settings (see e.g. Petit and Sanna Randaccio [21] , Glass and Saggi [7] , Mattoo et al. [19] ) or multi-sector models (e.g. Helpman et al. [15] ). A contribution which presents a truly dynamic model analyzing FDI strategies under technology differences is the paper by Das [2] . She presents a model where multinational firms transfer technology to their subsidiaries in foreign countries and where firms in the host country benefit from the technology transfer. In this respect our model will be related to the one presented by Das [2] . However the motivation and the main issues of our paper are very different since neither cost reduction motives or interregional wage differences nor global competition effects are issues in [2] . The focus there is on the intertemporally optimal price and quantity path of the subsidiaries that are only active in the (local) foreign market. Also the question whether the multinational firm should invest in FDI is not in the scope of that paper.
Other dynamic models that deal with technology transfer as a result of FDI in an oligopolistic market are the papers by Wang and Blomström [27] , Lin and Saggi [18] and Petit et al. [22] .
The focus of these contributions is rather on the level of technology to be transferred (Wang and Blomström [27] ), on the timing of FDI (Lin and Saggi [18] ) and on the question of how the choice choice between export and foreign direct investment affects the incentive to innovate (Petit et al. [22] ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the theoretical model. In section 3 we analyze the long-run behavior of the investment policy of the firm and in section 4 we study transitional dynamics. Section 5 concludes and points to possible extensions of the model. Appendix A briefly describes an example of our model with linear demand and all proofs are given in Appendix B.
The model
We consider a dynamic two-country model, where country H ('home-country') is a developed industrialized country whereas country F ('foreign country') is a newly industrializing country.
We consider a partial industry model where n firms from the two countries compete on an oligopolistic market. This common market can be seen as a joint market in a liberalized trade region like the EU or as the market in either of the two countries, where producers from abroad offer their goods through exports. Using such a specification we abstract from any 'market entry' motivations for FDI but concentrate on pure cost considerations. Among the competitors m firms are located in country F, and n − m (n > m) are based in country H. We consider a scenario where all these n − m firms currently produce their entire output at home, but one of the firms in country H considers to invest in country F in order to build up production capacities there. Firms are ordered in a way such that firm 1 is the potential foreign investor, firms with label i = 2, . . . , n − m are located in country H and do not invest abroad and firms with label i = n − m + 1, . . . , n are located in country F. We denote by Q i (t) the output of firm i at time t.
Firms produce using labor as the only variable production input. Production capacities of a firm in a country are determined by its capital stock there. Output per input unit in the two countries is given by A H (t) and A F (t) with A H (t) > A F (t). If a firm from country H produces in country F , productivity reads A HF (t) where A F (0) < A HF (0) < A H (0). Since our focus is on the effects of technological spill-overs generated by FDI on the evolution of the technology gap between the two countries, we abstract from technological change in the developed country and assume that A H and A HF are constant over time, whereas A F (t) may change over time due to spill-over effects. In both countries labor is supplied at wage rates w H and w F , where w H >> w F . We assume that wage rates are fixed and constant over time where a reason for such wage rigidities might be that industry wages in the two countries are determined by collective bargaining and associated institutional inflexibilities. The assumption of constant wages seems particularly strong for w F since within our framework labor productivity in that country will rise over time (relative to that in country H). Our focus is however on the positive effect of spill-overs on the competitiveness of firms in the developing country and therefore we assume for simplicity that also the wage in country F is constant over time. Our analysis would not be qualitatively altered if we allowed for rising wages in country F with a growth rate below the one of A F . The observation that wages grow much slower than productivity has been made in many newly industrializing countries.
Unit production costs read c i = w i /A i (t), i ∈ {H, F } for a firm producing in its home country and c HF = w F /A HF for a firm from country H producing in country F. We assume that firms in country H can reduce their unit production costs if they produce in the foreign country, i.e.
In order to produce abroad, firm 1 has to invest to build up production capacities in country F. We denote by I(t) ∈ R foreign investment of firm 1 and by K F (t) the capital stock of firm 1 in country F at time t. It should be noted that we also allow for negative investment, and due to the spillover-effects described below disinvestment might in principle be optimal for firm 1.
The capital accumulation equation is given bẏ
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The maximal quantity the firm can produce in country F is given by Q F 1 (t) = A HF K F (t). Gross investment costs of the firm are assumed to be given by βI + γI 2 , where β and γ are positive constants. This is a standard formulation in investment models with capital adjustment costs, where β denotes the price of capital (see e.g. Dockner et al. [5] ). Foreign direct investments of country H firms in country F generate technological spill-overs, which lead to a reduction of the productivity gap between the two countries. Because of these spill-overs, the investment of the home-country firm in the developing country will increase the technology level there, which raises the productivity of the firms in the developing country.
Therefore, we posit that the change in technology level in the foreign country is given by,
The speed of absorption is determined by the absorption rate λ > 0 and by cumulated past foreign investment, K F (t). The higher the capital stock in the foreign country, and the larger the productivity gap, the faster is absorption for a given level of λ. From an empirical point of view there has been some debate whether the size of spillovers indeed increases with the size of the technological gap. Our assumption of a positive relationship between spillovers and the size of the gap is for example backed by empirical findings in Griffith et al. [10] .
Oligopoly Production
Firms compete on an oligopolistic market for a homogenous good. The price at time t is determined by an inverse demand function P (Q), where we assume that P (.) is strictly decreasing with lim Q→0 P (Q) > w H /A H , lim Q→∞ P (Q) = 0, twice continuously differentiable on R + and that QP (Q) is strictly concave in Q. Furthermore, we assume that the market is sufficiently large such that firm 1 from country H always fully employs its capacity in country F, i.e.
In addition, we posit that all firms have sufficient production capacity in their home country to produce the oligopoly output and that there are no constraints on labor supply.
Given these assumptions marginal production costs of firms from country H are given by w H /A H regardless of their level of foreign investment. Producer from country F have constant marginal costs w F /A F .
In every period price and output quantities are given by equilibrium values for oligopoly markets with heterogenous production costs. Based on results by Murphy et al. [20] we can conclude that the Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique under our assumptions (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix). We denote by Q * H (A F ) and Q * F (A F ) the equilibrium quantities, where the dependence on A F is stressed because A F is the only determinant of the equilibrium quantities that is not fixed over time. The corresponding market price is denoted by P * (A F ) and the profits of firm 1 at time t are given by
The second term gives the cost savings of firm 1 due to its production outsourcing to country F.
Depending on the ratio of marginal costs of the producers in the two countries, both types of producers may sell positive quantities in equilibrium or the whole market may be served by producers from a single country. We denote byP the equilibrium price in a Cournot duopoly with (n-m) competitors that all have constant marginal costs c H . In order to be able to sell positive quantities firms in country F must have marginal costs below this level. Put differently,
Due to our assumptions about the inverse demand function we have A F < A HF . We do not consider scenarios where producers from country H are driven out of the market, i.e. we assume
the equilibrium quantity for producers from country H is still positive. Straightforward calculations then yield the following characterization of the dependency of the profits of firm 1 from the two state variables.
Lemma 1
(ii) For A HF ≥ A F > A F the profit function π * 1 is strictly decreasing with respect to A F , for
(iii) The profit function π * 1 is strictly increasing with respect to K F for all K F ≥ 0.
The optimal investment paths
We assume that all firms maximize their infinite horizon discounted profit streams. However, all firms except the potential foreign investor, firm 1, make only quantity decisions which do not directly influence any future payoffs. Therefore, as long as current quantity choices do not influence future actions of the competitors these firms face no inter-temporal decision problem.
Here we only consider equilibria where current actions are independent from past quantity choices, which implies that quantities are chosen according to the standard (static) Cournot equilibrium. The objective of firm 1 is to choose an investment strategy I(t) that maximizes
subject to (3), the capital accumulation equation (2), the state constraint
and the initial conditions A F (0) = A ini F < A HF and K F (0) = 0. The parameter ρ > 0 indicates the time preference of the firm. Obviously, the relevant range of capital stocks is bounded from above by the stockK corresponding to the monopoly output on the market and therefore the state-space of the problem is compact with (
In what follows we will characterize the inter-temporally optimal investment strategy for firm 1. Applying Pontryagin's maximum principle a canonical system of ordinary differential equations can be derived that has to be satisfied by the optimal trajectories 2 . Since the Hamiltonian of the dynamic optimization problem of firm 1 is not concave with respect to the state the Maximum principle provides only necessary but no sufficient optimality conditions (see e.g. Sethi and Thompson [24] ).
Lemma 2 For any state trajectory (K F (t), A F (t)) that corresponds to an optimal investment strategy of firm 1 there exist piecewise absolutely continuous co-states µ 1 (t), µ 2 (t) and a multiplier ν(t) ≥ 0 such that
in addition to (3) and (2) the costate equationṡ
as well as
hold and the transversality conditions lim t→∞ e −ρt µ 1 K F = 0, lim t→∞ e −ρt µ 2 A F = 0 are satisfied.
In addition, at any time τ where the trajectory hits the boundary K = 0 the co-state µ 1 might have a jump with lim t→τ − µ 1 (t) ≤ lim t→τ + µ 1 (t).
2 In what follows we omit the time index t.
In the following section we characterize the potential steady states of the system under optimal investment, and analyze how the initial technology gap (A HF − A F ) determines which steady state is reached.
Steady state analysis
All steady states for the considered model have to be rest points of the differential equations (2), (3), (6) and (7). There exist two different types of steady states, the catch-up steady state, where firm 1 invests abroad and where eventually the productivity of firms based in country F reaches the productivity level of the foreign investor, and the no-investment steady states where firm 1 has zero capacity in the foreign country and the productivity of firms in country F does not catch up to the level A HF . A necessary condition for the existence of a catch-up steady-state is that the price of capital is not too large. In particular we assume in what follows that
The next two propositions provide precise characterizations of the two types of steady states 3 .
Proposition 1 Given assumptions (1) and (8), there exists a saddle point stable catch-up steady
It should be noted that in the steady state,μ 1 > 0 andμ 2 < 0 holds. This is intuitive sincê µ 1 andμ 2 are the shadow prices of the capital stock in the developing country and of technology in the foreign country, respectively, where the first has a positive effect while the second has a negative effect on the profits of the home country firm.
Proposition 1 states that as long as unit costs for firm 1 in country F are below the unit costs at home there are initial values for the productivity gap (A HF − A F ) and for the foreign capital stock such that it is optimal for firm 1 to have positive production capacities in country F.
However, this does not necessarily imply that it is optimal for firm 1 to start foreign investment if currently there is none. It turns out that the absorption rate plays a crucial role in that
as the threshold for the spillover intensity. The next proposition shows that as long as the intensity is above this level it depends on the productivity gap A HF − A F whether it is optimal for firm 1 to start investing in country F.
Proposition 2 For λ >λ there exists a valueĀ
(ii) For all initial values A F ∈ (Ā F , A HF ] the catch-up steady-state is reached in the long run.
(iii) There exists a subset A of the interval [A F ,Ā F ] with positive measure such that for each A F ∈ A there is a steady state where I = K = 0. For A F ∈ int(A) the steady state is neutrally stable.
The optimal investment depends non-monotonously on the initial technology gap. If the gap is very large or very small it is optimal to invest abroad, however in an intermediate range there
exists a continuum of steady states for K = 0 where no investments take place. Whereas no single steady state in this continuum is asymptotically stable, the connected set of equilibria has a positive basin of attraction. If in a steady state withÂ F ∈ int(A) a small perturbation to a positive capital stock occurs, this does not induce the firm to start investing in the foreign country and the foreign capital stock will return to zero. During this process small technological spill-overs occur leading to a small increase in A F . Accordingly, the system will end up again at a steady state in the continuum of no-investment steady-states. However the brief perturbation has lead to a slight increase in the value of A F . If the initial technology gap is so large that potential competitors in the foreign country are not able to gain positive market shares in should be noted that for initial conditions that lie directly on the boundary of the basins the firm has two investment paths that yield identical discounted payoffs, where one of the two implies convergence to the catch-up steady state whereas on the other path the foreign capital stock is reduced to zero 5 . We can see from this figure that the basin of attraction of the no-investment steady-states includes the states where the initial productivity gap is large and positive initial investment is optimal. The figure illustrates a situation where the set of noinvestment steady-states is just a single interval on the K = 0 line. In order to guarantee that there are unique switching points from positive investment to no-investment and back to positive investment additional regularity assumptions about the market demand have to be made.
Proposition 3 If
This condition is in particular satisfied for a linear demand function. 4 This illustration is based on the parameter setting we will use in our numerical analysis in the next section. 5 Recently some literature has emerged studying the properties of the boundary between different basins of attraction in high-dimensional optimization problems, so called DNS curves (see e.g. Haunschmied et al. [14] ). Before we discuss the transient dynamics of the optimal investment path let us briefly examine the impact of some crucial model parameters on the equilibrium constellation.
A decrease of the absorption rate λ does not affect the foreign capital stock in the catch-up steady state. However, it decreasesĀ F thereby increasing the range of initial productivity gaps which lead to convergence to that steady state. The thresholdĀ F collides from above with A F as λ becomes small. The slower the technology transfer from firm 1 to firms in country F is, the larger becomes the initial productivity gap that prevents firm 1 from foreign investment.
Recalling that investment in country F increases the level of technology of the firms there and, thus, the competitiveness of these firms, this result is very plausible. If this process is slow, the negative inter-temporal effect of investing in the foreign country is small, making investment profitable for firm 1.
Turning to the impact of the wages in the home country H on the steady-state constellation it becomes clear from the expression forK F that the capital stock firm 1 holds in country F in the catch-up steady-state decreases if w H is lowered. Lower wages at home lead to less transfer of production abroad. Furthermore, a decrease of w H has several effects on investment incentives.
First, the cost savings that are realized when production is moved abroad go down, which decreases investment incentives. Second, marginal costs of production at home are decreased which changes the equilibrium price and therefore also alters the marginal effect of an increase of A F on firm profits. Investment increases the speed of A F growth and therefore this effect also influences investment incentives. In general it is not clear how these effects compare to each other, but for special cases, like a linear demand function, it can be shown that the direct cost-saving effect dominates. Also, a decrease in w H makes it harder for foreign firms to sell positive quantities on the common market and the range of A F values where investment is positive because no foreign firm is in the market becomes larger.
We summarize these considerations in the following corollary. (ii) For a linear demand function and λ >λ, both thresholdsĀ F and A F go up if w H is decreased.
An implication of the second part of this corollary is that if A F (0) is only slightly above the thresholdĀ F a small decrease in domestic wages might reduce the long run foreign capital stock of firm 1 fromK F to zero. In the following section we will demonstrate with a numerical example that this second effect of decreasing w H might imply that a decrease in domestic wages might lead to a substantial increase of the total labor income earned by workers in the considered industry in country H.
Transition dynamics, labor-income and the role of domestic wages
Having characterized the steady states of the trajectories under optimal investment and their basins of attraction, we will now consider properties of the transient dynamics before the steady states are reached and evaluate the corresponding evolution of the profits of producers and the factor income of labor in country H. To that end we rely on a numerical analysis 6 of a version of the model with linear demand The inverse demand function is given by
whereP is a positive constant.
The default parameter values used in the numerical calculations are given in table 1. The ratio of wages in the two countries is four to one and the monetary unit is normalized in a way that the wage in country F is w F = 1. Unit costs of production for firm 1 in country F (w F /A HF = 0.5) are well below the unit costs at home (w H /A H = 1) and, therefore, assumption 1 is satisfied.
In figure 2 we show trajectories of the foreign capital stock (a), foreign productivity (b), investment (c), profits (d), production quantities (e) of firm 1 and the price of the good (f)
for initial values K F (0) = 0, A F (0) = 1.7. SinceĀ F < 1.7 for this parameter setting, these initial values are in the basin of attraction of the catch-up steady state. Accordingly foreign 6 The numerical analysis was carried out using a computer code provided by Lars Grüne, which uses a numerical dynamic programming algorithm with flexible grid size in the state-space. See Grüne and Semmler [11] for details. foreign productivity triggered by foreign investment is particularly fast. As concerns production, we observe that the total quantity produced by firm 1 is slightly decreasing over time, whereas the quantity produced abroad grows significantly. The slight decrease in total production of firm 1 is due to a decrease over time of the price of the produced good. The downward trend of the price is a result of the increasing productivity of firms in country F, which induces a reduction of their unit costs.
Whereas figure 2 illustrates the case where the foreign investment is optimal for the firm because of the small size of the technological gap, in figure 3 we show the state dynamics under optimal investment if the initial technological gap is so large that the foreign competitors cannot offer positive quantities on the market. In that case the foreign investment is a short-run phenomenon and production in country F is terminated once the technological gap has been reduced to a level where foreign competitors could enter the market. For our parameter setting the threshold A F = 0.33 and it can be seen in figure 3 (b) that this is exactly the long run level of A F under optimal investment of firm 1. As briefly discussed in the introduction a foreign investment pattern of investment followed by disinvestment can be observed by a substantial percentage of firms that outsource parts of their production. According to our analysis such behavior is not necessarilly induced by myopic planning or incorrect expectations, but might be due to perfectly rational intertemporal considerations of the investor. It exploits the (short-run) potential for production cost reduction without generating additional competition in the (global) market.
In the remainder of this section we will focus on the impact of changes in the initial productivity gap A HF −A F (0) and in the wage level in country H on the dynamics generated by optimal investment behavior of firm 1. The focus on domestic wages is motivated by a lively debate in several European countries about the effects of relatively high domestic wages on the transfer of production abroad and on domestic labor income. In many industries in these countries wages are determined by collective bargaining in a rigid institutional setting and -as assumed in our model -have been very inflexible in previous years.
To discuss the impact of changes in these parameters we consider not only firm profits in country H but also the income earned by workers in the considered industry in that country.
Looking at these two variables allows to get some indication of welfare effects in country H in the framework of our partial equilibrium model. It should however be kept in mind that these considerations do not take into account the disutility of labor for workers and also the effects of price changes on consumer surplus in country H. Since we do not explicitly model the labor market and domestic demand in country H, such effects are not captured in our model.
The (nominal) labor income of workers in country H is given by
Assuming that workers discount future income with the same rate firms discount future profits, the discounted accumulated labor income under the optimal foreign investment strategy reads where (K F * , A * F ) are the state trajectories under the optimal investment path for initial condi-
In figure 4 (a) the trajectory of labor income for the standard parameter setting underlying figure 2 is depicted. Labor income decreases over time. This is due to the fact that firm 1 reduces the quantity produced at home thereby reducing the amount of domestic labor that is employed. This effect is stronger than the negative effect of production outsourcing on prices and, therefore, labor income in country H decreases. The dotted line in figure 4(a) The positive effect of a wage decrease for A ini F = 1.7 is based on the impact of w H on the steady state level of K F . In the previous section we have pointed out that a wage decrease also has a second important effect, namely the increase ofĀ F . If due to this increase the thresholdĀ F passes the initial foreign technology level A ini F , the effects of a wage decrease can be much more substantial than observed above. The initial conditions K F = 0, A F = A ini F suddenly become an equilibrium and it is optimal for firm 1 not to engage in any direct foreign investment. There is a discontinuous change in the optimal investment strategy, which becomes constant at zero. The discontinuity of the optimal investment strategy and the labor income which we discussed with respect to the parameter w H of course also occurs with respect to changes of the other model parameters, in particular with respect to the initial technology level in the foreign country or the technology absorption rate. In figure 6 we show accumulated firm profits and accumulated labor income as a function of A ini F for a domestic wage of w H = 4. Workers and the domestic firm gain from an increase in the initial technological gap. The jump of accumulated labor income atĀ F can be clearly seen. Note also that for values of A F < A F labor income slightly increases as the technological gap gets smaller. This is due to the fact that as long as the foreign firms are not in the market the production quantity of firm 1 is unaffected by A F but the foreign investment of the firm becomes smaller the closer the foreign firms get to the point where they can compete on the market.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a dynamic model of a firm which competes with local and foreign firms in an oligopolistic market. The firm has an incentive to invest and produce in a developing country because of lower unit costs there, but raises the technology level of its potential competitors in the developing economy by investing, due to spill-overs of investment.
Our analysis shows that there are two possible types of long run outcomes, a catch-up scenario, where the domestic firm invests abroad and the productivity of the foreign competitors in the long run matches the productivity of the domestic subsidiary in country F, and a noinnovation scenario where the domestic firm decides against FDI. In the absence of an initial capital stock in the foreign country positive investment is optimal if the technological gap is either very large or very small. Furthermore, we have shown that an implication of the co-existence of or positive (in the catch-up scenario) effects on domestic labor income. If we assume that even without FDI the productivity gap will slowly close over time, these findings suggest that the qualitative effect of changes in the wage level might change radically over time. Clearly, this has implications for wage policy if domestic labor income is of concern. Finally, we have shown under which circumstances patterns of positive foreign investment followed by disinvestment correspond are in accordance with intertemporally optimal behavior of the investing firm.
The fact that we consider a scenario where only one of the firms in country H has the opportunity to invest abroad might be seen as a severe restriction of our analysis. However, As to future research, several extensions of the model should be considered. In the current analysis the level of the technology associated with the direct foreign investment was considered as given. It would be interesting to study optimal investment behavior allowing for an endogenous determination and dynamic changes of the technological level the firm uses in the foreign country. Furthermore, the choice of R&D investments of the firms in the foreign country might be incorporated into the analysis. There is empirical evidence and much discussion in the literature about the fact that a firm's ability to absorb technological spillovers depends positively on its R&D activities (see e.g. Cohen and Levinthal [1] ). Taking into account such effects would make the spillover intensity λ an endogenous variable and generate strategic effects between the competitors in the different countries.
Appendix A: Example with linear demand
In case demand is of the linear form (9) standard calculations show that equilibrium quantities are given by
Inserting into the profit function for firm 1 gives
Lemma 3 Given our assumptions about demand and cost structure there exists a unique equilibrium in the Cournot oligopoly game.
Proof: Murphy et al. [20] show that the following conditions are sufficient for existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly game:
(a) The inverse demand function p(Q) is continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing with respect to Q.
(b) For every firm i the cost function is continuously differentiable, non-decreasing and convex with respect to Q i .
(c) The function Q p(Q) is is strictly concave with respect to Q. (e) There exists a vector of quantities (Q sur 1 , . . . , Q sur n ) that maximizes total surplus on the market.
Conditions (a) to (c) follow directly from our assumptions. To see that condition (d) is satisfied it should be first noted that due to the linear cost structure joint market profits are maximized if all output is produced by one single firm which has the lowest unit costs. Accordingly, we only have to consider the monopoly problem of that single firm. Since all unit costs are strictly positive, the assumption lim Q→∞ P (Q) = 0 implies that the monopolist's profits are decreasing in Q for sufficiently large Q and this implies the existence of a solution to the monopolist's problem. Concerning (e) we can again concentrate on the case where all output is produced by a single firm i. Assumptions P (0) > c H , P ′ (Q) < 0 and lim Q→∞ P (Q) = 0 imply that the surplus maximization problem has a (unique) solution characterized by P (Q) = c i . Therefore there exists a unique equilibrium in the Cournot game we are considering.
Proof of Lemma 1:
(i) Since P (Q) is twice continuously differentiable, it follows directly from the first order conditions that equilibrium quantities are continuously differentiable with respect to A F and K F on (0, A) ∪ (A F , A HF ] × [0, ∞). Hence, also the profit function of Firm 1 is continuously differentiable with respect to these variables on that domain.
(ii) Direct calculation yields under consideration of the envelope theorem that
where
To determine the signs of the derivatives of the equilibrium quantities with respect to A F we implicitly differentiate the first order conditions. Assume that A HF ≥ A F > A F . Then firms from both countries offer positive quantities on the market, where all producers from the same country offer the same quantities. Therefore, equilibrium quantities are characterized by the first order conditions
Total differentiation with respect to A F gives
and we obtain
Adding (n − m) times (13) to m times (14) gives
which implies
The assumption that QP (Q) is strictly concave implies that 2P ′ (Q)+QP ′′ (Q) < 0 and therefore the bracket in the denominator is positive. Because of P ′ (Q) < 0 we get overall that Q * ′ (A F ) > 0. Taking this into account we obtain by inserting (13) into (10) that
If A F < A F all firms in country F produce zero in equilibrium and the equilibrium quantities of firms in country H are therefore independent from A F . Accordingly,
(iii) Follows directly from w H /A H > w F /A HF .
Proof of Lemma 2:
The Hamiltonian for the investment problem of firm 1 is given by
and taking into account the state-constraint we obtain the Lagrangian
According to Pontryagin's maximum principle for every optimal investment path there must exist piecewise absolutely continuous co-states µ i (t) and a piecewise continuous multiplier ν(t) ≥ 0 such that investment at each t maximizes L, the co-states satisfy the equationṡ
for the multiplier νK = 0 holds for all t and the transversality conditions are satisfied. Furthermore, for for each time τ i of discontintuity of µ 1 there exists an η(τ i ) ≥ 0 with
(see e.g. Sethi and Thompson [24] and Hartl et al. [13] ). Because in our problem no movement of the state on the K = 0 line is possible, the problem is time autonomous and has an infinite time horizon, it is obvious that an optimal trajectory can never leave the boundary once it has hit it. Therefore, the only possible dicontinuity of µ 1 may occur at the time when the optimal trajectory hits the K = 0 line. Direct calculation together with (16) yields the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that K F = 0 holds. SettingȦ F = 0,K F = 0,μ 1 = 0,μ 2 = 0, we obtain the other variables of this steady state asÂ
Not that due to assumption (8) we haveμ 1 > β and therefore foreign investment and foreign capital at this steady state are indeed positive. The value forK can be obtained by direct calculations. Furthermore, Lemma 1(ii) implies thatμ 2 < 0.
To show that this fixed point of the canonical system is indeed a steady-state of the optimal policy we observe that for (K, A F ) = (0, A HF ) optimal investment is positive (which will be proven in Proposition 2), which implies that the considered fixed point is the only candidate for a steady-state on the line A F = A HF . For A F (0) = A HF we have A F (t) = A HF ∀t and the relevant state-space reduces to one dimension. Standard results imply that every control problem with a one-dimensional compact state space must have at least one steady-state and therefore the fixed point of the canonical system characterized above must indeed be a steady-state under the optimal investment rule.
To determine stability of this steady state we consider the Jacobian at the steady state, which is given by
It is easy to show that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are given by
with the inequalities due to our assumption (1). Since there are two negative and two positive eigenvalues, the fixed-point is a saddle point of the canonical system and therefore the steady state is locally asymptotically stable.
Proof of Proposition 2
We start by considering the necessary conditions that have to be satisfied at a steady-state witĥ K F = 0. In any such steady stateÎ = 0 must hold, which impliesμ 1 = β. Taking that into account we obtain fromμ 1 = 0 that
Due toν ≥ 0 this is equivalent tô
Furthermore,μ 2 = 0 requires
This implies that a steady-state withK = 0 can only exist for values of A F where
It is easy to see that q 1 is strictly decreasing in A F with lim A F →A HF − q 1 (A F ) = −∞.
Furthermore, taking into account that there exist 0 < Q <Q with 
intersection point between q 1 and q 2 in that interval. A sufficient condition for the existence of such an intersection point is q 1 (A F ) > q 2 (A F ) and it is easy to see that this inequality is equivalent to λ >λ. Accordingly, under the condition λ >λ there exists a set A ⊆ [A F , A HF ) with positive measure such that for all A F ∈ A we have q 1 (A F ) ≥ q 2 (A F )) and there is a fixed point of the canonical system withK = 0,
Considering the range A F ∈ (0, A F ), it follows directly from Lemma 1(ii) that q 2 (A F ) = 0 > q 1 (A F ). Therefore, there is no steady-state with K = 0 and optimal investment is positive for
Point (i) of the proposition follows directly from the arguments above. To show point (ii), it should be noted that because ofȦ F ≥ 0 no optimal cycles can occur. Therefore all optimal trajectories have to converge to some steady state and for A F (0) >Ā F the only candidate is the catch-up steady-state.
Finally, we have to show (iii). For any state (A F , 0) with A F ∈ A there is a co-state vector and a non-negative multiplier such that the state-costate-multiplier vector is a fixed point of the canonical system. However, since for our problem in general the Hamiltonian is not concave with respect to the states the maximum principle provides necessary but not sufficient optimality conditions. Therefore, we still have to show that positive investment is not optimal for initial states (0, A F ) with A F ∈ A. Assume that there exists some valueÃ F and some valueβ of the parameter β where q 1 (Ã F ) > q 2 (Ã F ) holds, but positive investment is optimal at the state (0,Ã F ). This means that V (0,Ã F ) > π * 1 (0,Ã F )/ρ, where V denotes the value function of the problem for firm 1. If we continuously increase the parameter β then V (0,Ã F ) decreases continuously and for sufficiently large β no investment is optimal for A F =Ã F . This implies that for someβ >β we must have
It is well known that V (0, properties must be at the intersection of q 1 (A F ) and q 2 (A F ). Increasing β shifts q 1 upwards but does not affect q 2 and therefore we have q 1 (Ã F ) > q 2 (Ã F ) for β =β. This contradicts the observation that q 1 and q 2 must intersect atÃ F and therefore our assumption that positive investment is optimal at (0,Ã F ) must have been wrong. Accordingly, any state (0, A F ) with A F ∈ A must indeed be a steady-state of the optimal policy.
To analyze the stability of these steady states, note that for every steady state withÂ F ∈ int(A) optimal investment is zero for all states with K F = 0 in the neighborhood of the steady state. Assume that there exists a sequence of states K F,s ,Ã F,s values of the co-states and multiplier byμ i,s ,ν s , we must haveν s = 0 for all s. Assuming without restriction of generality that the sequence of co-states converges 10 we denote the limit 10 Obviously, we can restrict attention to a compact subset of the co-state space and therefore there must alway exist a convergent subsequence we can consider.
by (μ 1 ,μ 2 ) = lim s→∞ (μ 1,s ,μ 2,s ). Obviously, we must haveμ 1 −β 2γ ≥ 0 and by continuity of the Hamiltonian we get H(0,Â F ,μ 1 ,μ 2 )/ρ ≥ π * 1 (0,Â F )/ρ. If this inequality is strict we get a contradiction to the fact that (0,Â F ) is a steady state. If the inequality holds as equality, we must haveμ 1 = β,ν = 0 and (0,Â,μ 1 ,μ 2 ) can only be a fixed point of the canonical system if q 1 (Â F ) = q 2 (Â F ), which contradicts thatÂ F ∈ int(A). This implies that no such sequence exsits and accordinlgy there must exist a neighborhood U ofÂ F such that for all (K F , A F ) ∈ U we haveK F = I(K F , A F ) − δK F < −ǫ for some ǫ > 0. Hence, after any sufficiently small deviation of the state from (0,Â F ) the optimal trajectory returns to the line K = 0 and a steady-state in the interior of A therefore is neutrally stable.
.
Proof of Proposition 3:
If In case of a linear demand, we obtain from the expressions given in Appendix A that
holds for all A F > A F . .
Proof of Corollary 1:
To prove point (i) of the corollary we have to observe that lim λ→0 sup[q 1 (A F )|A F ∈ [A F , A HF )] = −∞ and therefore for sufficiently small λ we have q 1 (A F ) < q 2 (A F ) ∀A F ∈ [0, A HF ) and therefore there exists no steady-state withK = 0.
The observation that A F is decreasing in w h for linear demand follows directly from the expression given in Appendix A. ConcerningĀ F , we observe first that Q * H increases for decreasing w H and therefore ∂π * 1 (K F ,A F ) ∂A F decreases for decreasing w H . Therefore q 2 (A F ) shifts downwards for decreasing w H on the interval [A F , A HF ]. On the other hand, the curve q 1 (A F ) shifts up-wards if w H becomes smaller. Taking into account the arguments in the proof of proposition 3 this implies that the unique intersection point between q 1 and q 2 moves to the right. .
